
India's power, water, transport, and manufacturing networks increasingly connect operational technology to IT. That connectivity unlocks efficiency, and a new attack surface. Securing it requires tools built for OT, not retrofitted IT tools.
Why IT security tools fall short in OT
OT devices were designed for reliability and decades-long lifespans, not for patching. They speak industrial protocols such as Modbus, DNP3, IEC 61850, and S7. An active IT scanner can crash a PLC simply by probing it. Security here must be passive-first and protocol-aware.
The NCIIPC and sector regulators now expect critical-infrastructure operators to demonstrate visibility and segmentation across their OT estate.
Visibility before control
You cannot protect what you cannot see. Start with passive monitoring (NetAware NDR) on a SPAN or tap port to build an asset inventory and a baseline of normal traffic. This alone surfaces rogue devices, unexpected external connections, and misconfigurations, with zero operational risk.
Segment along the Purdue model
Enforce IT/OT separation with a NetShield NGFW between zones, and microsegment within the OT network so a compromise in one cell cannot reach the controllers in another. Allow only the specific protocols and flows each zone needs.
Respond without disrupting uptime
Correlate OT and IT events in one console so an analyst sees the full kill chain. Response playbooks for OT favour alerting and isolation over automated blocking, because an automated block in a control loop can be more dangerous than the threat.
Segmenting along the Purdue model
What the plant floor is actually speaking
See it in your environment
Talk to a NetSense security architect about applying this to your stack.